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[L. A. No. 21956. In Bank. Oct. 21, 1952.]

RICHFIELD OIL CORPORATION (a Corporation) et al.,
Appellants, v. WALTER M. CRAWFORD et al., Defendants and Respondents; MAURICE HENDERSON
et a1., Interveners and Respondents.
[1] Oil-Regulation-Spacing of Wells.-The word "well" in Pub.
Resources Code, § 3602, regulating the spacing of oil and gas
wells, means the surface location, not the entire length of
the shaft.
[2] Id.-Regulation-Spacing of Wells.-By comparing Pub. Resources Code, § 3600, with other sections of the oil well spacing
legislation, the word "located" may be interpreted as usually
referring only to wells on the surface of the ground, and the
words "on which the well is situated" as indicating that the
statute regulates wells "on" a parcel as opposed to wells
"in or under" a parcel.
[3] Id.-Regulation-Spacing of Wells.-Although Pub. Resources
Code, § 3606, permits slant drilling into a parcel containing
an acrc or morc when all or substantially all of the surface
of such parcel is unsuitable for surface location of an oil well,
[1] Ser 8 Ca1.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (194S Rev.), Oil and Gas, § 141;
Am.Jur., Gas and Oil, § 107.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3,7,9] Oil, §3; [4] Statutes, §181;
[5,6] Statutes, § 180(2); [8] Statutes, § 124; [10] Boundaries.
§ 54(1); [11,14,15] Boundaries, § 54(9); [12] Boundaries, l4;
[13] Boundaries, § 19(3).
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and provides that a subsurface survey "shall be open to
inspection by any other operator in the field in which the well
is located," the fact that Pub. Resources Code, § 3600, does
not similarly protect adjoining landowners or even provide for
a subsurface survey indicates that both sections were not intended to apply to subsurface locations of oil wells.
[4] Statutes - Construction - Change of Language. - Where a
statute with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute
concerning the same subject is significant to show that a
different intention existed.
[5] ld.-Construction-Contemporaneous Construction.-The contemporaneous administrative construction of a statute by those
charged with its enforcement and interpretation, while not
necessarily controlling, is entitled to great weight, and courts '
generally will not depart from such construction unless it is
clearly erroneous or unauthorized.
"
[6] ld. - Construction - Departmental Construction. - Althougo i
failure to enforce statutes of this state will not estop a state
agency from their subsequent enforcement, past administrative
action is evidence of the limits of the power to act, particularly
when a statute is reenacted without change in the light of •
settled administrative interpretation.
[7] Oil-Regulation-Prevention of Waste.-Preyention of waste
of oil and gas is a matter of public concern, and it is within \
the legislative power to prevent such waste.
[8] Statutes-Construction-Circumstances Indicating Legislative
Intent.-The objective sought to be achieved by a statute as .
well as the evil to be prevented is of prime consideration iD, '1
its interpretation.
'
"<:1
'1
[9] Oil- Regulation - Spacing of Wells. - The oil well spaciDg
statute (Pub. Resources Code, § 3600) applies only to the 8111'face location of oil wells.
10] Boundaries - Evidence - Testimony of Surveyors and Other
Witnesses.-Surveyors and civil engineers, like other experts,
may giye testimony on questions involving matters of technical
skill and experience with which they are peculiarly acquainted.
[11] ld.-Evidence-Parol Evidence.-Testimony that good eugineering practice requires an astronomical observation to survey
a "due north" call and that ordinarily such a call should be ron
as "true north" is admissible not for the purpose of varying or
contradicting the terms of the deed in which such words occur,
but to aid the court in its task of translating such words into
1

[4] See Ca1.Jur., Statutes, §154j Am.Jur., Statutes, §214.
[5J See Ca1.Jur., Statutes, § 152; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 319.
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monuments on the !;urfac(> of the enrth in accord with accept/·Il
surveying practices.
[12] Id.-Particular Words.-Unless other terms of a deed or admissible extrinsic evidence show that a different method was
intended by the parties, a "due north" cnll !;hould be surveyed
on an astronomical basis.
[13] Id.-Control of Natural and Permanent Objects.-A call to
the known boundary of a ranch prl'vails over a call to its
astronomical bearing.
[14] Id.-Evidence-Parol Evidence.-Although evidence of the
negotiations preceding execution of boundary agreements !nIlY
be admissible as between the purties thereto, a special interpretation of a quitclaim deed could not be enforced against a
party relying on words of the instrument and without knowledge of the meaning attached thereto by the other party to
that deed.
[15] Id.-Evidence-Parol Evidence.-Expert testimony of surveyors and engineers showing the proper method of surveying
the calls in a deed was admissible as against both parties to the
deed; but after defendants had relied on the ordinary meaning of the words of the instrument, evidence of negotiations
of parties to the boundary agreements was not admissible to
the detriment of defendants, for it would be unjust to charge
them with the secret interpretation of other parties.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Barbara County. Charles F. Blackstock, Judge.· Affirmed.
Action for declaratory relief in which a complaint in intervention was filed. Judgment for interveners affirmed.
Cree & Brooks, John Brooks, Marlon F. Schade, Griffith &
Thornburgh, C. Douglas Smith, O'Meh'eny & Myers, Jackson
W. Chance and Rodney K. Potter for Appellants.
Everett S. Layman, Kenneth S. Carey, Howard H. Bell,
Richard E. Tuttle, Lawrence L. Otis and James F. Healey,
Jr., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants.
Joseph A. Ball, Clark Heggeness, Ball, Hunt & Hart,
Schauer, Ryon & McMahon, Thomas M. Mullen and Harry E.
Templeton for Interveners and Respondents.
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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Arthur C. Fisher, Overton, Lyman, Prince & Vermille,
Donald H. Ford, Faries & McDowell, McIntyre Faries and
Wayne R. Hackett as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
'!'HAYNOH, J.-'l'his appeal involves the intcrpretation
alJ(l application to certain parccls of land of section 3600
of the Public Resources Code r<'gulating the spacing of oil
and gas wells. 'fhe accompanying diagram shows the relationship of the parcels and the wells thereon.
.
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All oil wells are producing from the Colgrove formation
in the Cuyama oil field. The dotted line across the diagram
represents the Hadley-Stone fault, running in a northwestsoutheast direction. This fault acts as a barrier to oil and
gas and thus limits production to that portion of the Colgrove formation north and east of the fault.
All of the property is owned by H. S. Russell. In 1945 he
leased the property to the Norris Oil Company. Subsequently
in 1945, Norris subleased parcels two and three to predecessors in interest of plaintiff Richfield Oil Corporation. In
1947 Norris subleased parcels one and four to Carpenter and
Henderson, plaintiffs in intervention. In 1948 Carpenter
and Henderson subleased parcels one and four to Anderson

Oct. 1952]

RICHFIELD OIL CoRP. 11. CRAWFORD

733

[39 C.2d '129; 249 P.2d 600]

Associates who in turn assigned an undivided half-interest
therein to Richfield. Shortly thereafter Anderson Associates
and Richfield quitclaimed all their interest in parcel four
to Carpenter and Henderson. In June, 1949, Carpenter and I
Henderson subleased parcel four to defendants Crawford and
Hiles. Since July 25, 1949, defendants have been producing
oil from Well 1. 1'he snrfa8e location of this well is more
than 200 feet from the boundaries of parcel four, but its producing interval or bottom is in oil producing land northeast
of tIle fanlt, less thal1 ]00 feet from the boundaries of defendants' property. Richfield is sublessee under oil and gas leases
for parcels one, two, and three, and is producing oil from
Wells 88, 187, ]8 and 11 on those parcels.
Richfield sought to enjoin operation of Well 1 and recover
damages for its past operations on two theories: that the well
was operated in violation of Public Resources Code, section
3600, and that it constituted a subsurface trespass on Richfield's property. In a third action Richfield sought a declara- •
tion as to the location of the boundary between the parcels ,
in relation to the subsurface location of Well 1. Plaintiffs
in intervention, Carpenter and Henderson, sought declaratory
relief to have their rights declared respecting royalty interests in Well 1. The trial court denied Richfield injunctive
and monetary relief, declared that the well was entirely
within defendants' property, and declared that Carpenter and
Henderson owned 23 per cent of the production of WeIll and
that Riehfield had no interest therein. Richfield appeals from
the judgment.
Oonstruction of Section 3600
Section 3600 provides that "any well hereafter drilled for
oil or gas, or hereafter drilled and permitted to produce oil
or gas, which is located within 100 feet of an outer boundary
of the parcel of land on which the well is situated, or within
100 feet of a public street or road or highway dedicated prior
to the eOlllIlH.'J\cement of drilling of the well, or within 150
feet of either a well b('ing drilled or a well theretofore drilled
which is producing oil or gas or a well which bas been drilled
and is not produeing but wllieh is capable of producing oil or
gas, i" a public nuisanC'('." Richfield contends tbat Well 1
is a publiC' nuisance, on tlle ground that it "is located within
]00 ft't't of an outt'1' houndary of thE' parcel of land on which
the well is sitnatt'd." Richfield concedes that the surface
loeation of 'Vel! 1 is more than 100 feet from the boundary,
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but contE-nds that the statute is violated when the producing
interval of a well is less than 100 feet from the boundary.
Defendants contend that SE'ctioJ;l 3600 restricts only the surface location of oil wells and doE's not apply to the producing
intervals thereof.
Richfield urges that" well" is commonly understood to mean
the entire shaft from the surface of the earth to the oil pool
below and that in oil leases "boundary" usually includes
"underground boundary." (See Federal Oil Co. v. Brower,
36 Ca1.2d 367, 370 [224 P.2d 4].) Defendants urge on the
other hand that the word "located" usually refers only to
wells on the surface of the ground (see Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.App.2d 825, 829 [128 P.2d 408J)
and that the words "on which the well is situated" indicate
that the statute regulates wells "on" a parcel as opposed to
wells "in or under" a parcel. (Cf. Richter v. Adams, 43 Cal.
App.2d 184, 187 [110 P.2d 486J.) [1] The word "well,"
or any other word in section 3600, cannot be disassociated from
its context or the oil well spacing legislation as a whole.
Thus, in section 3602 the context shows that "well" means
the surface location, for the phrase therein "placed as to be
as far from the lateral boundary lines of the parcel of land
as the configuration of the surface and the existing improvements thereon will permit" could have no reference to the
entire length of the shaft. Our inquiry into the proper interpretation of section 3600 cannot be guided solely by the dictionary meaning of each word standing alone; we must consider the well spacing legislation as a whole to dete~e 1
the meaning of section 3600. (People v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d ~
638, 642 [150 P.2d 888] ; Myers v. Alta Construction Co., 37
Ca1.2d 739, 742 [235 P .2d 1].)
[2] Comparison of section 3600 with other sections of the
well spacing legislation supports defendants' interpretation.
Thus section 3606, providing for the location of wells when
the surface of the land is unsuitable for drilling, permits
slant drilling into a parcel containing an acre or more when
all or substantially all of the surface of such parcel is unsuitable for surface location of a well. This section also provides
that in such cases the producing interval must be located not
less than 75 feet from the outer boundary of the parcel into
which it is drilled and that tlle surface location must be not
less than 25 feet from the outer boundary of the parcel
into which it is drilled. _Section 3606 finally provides that

)
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"to enforce the provisions of this section" the State Oil and
Gas Supervisor may require the operator to make a subsurface directional survey of the well and to file a plat of
such survey with the supervisor, which is open to public
inspection.
[3] Section 3600,however, does not provide that a sub- i
snrface survey may be required by the supervisor. Under·
Hichfield's interpretation, although the Legislature has given
the supervisor ample power to enforce part of the well spacing :
legislation, it fails to provide him with one of the most effec- I
tive means of discovering violations of another part thereof.1
If the Legislature intended enforcement of section 3600 to
be left to action by private parties (as in the present case),
difficulties remain. Section 3606 provides that the subsurface
survey" shall be open to inspection by any other operator in
the field in which the well is located." Section 3600, however, does not similarly protect adjoining landowners. Since
seetions 3600 and 3606 were reenacted together in 1947, it '
is difficult to believe that the Legislature would provide such
contrasting enforcement procedures if it intended both sections
to apply to subsurface locations of oil wells. [4] ."Where
a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute
concerning a related subject is significant to show that a
different intention existed." (People v. Valentine, 28 Ca1.2d
121, 142 [169 P.2d 1].)
An interpretation of section 3600 as applying only to
the surface location of wells is supported by the administrative interpretation of that section since its enactment in 1931.
The trial court admitted the deposition of R. D. Bush, State
Oil and Gas Supervisor. It appears therein that from 1931
to 1945 his office interpreted section 3600 as applying only
to surface locations of oil wells. Before any well was drilled
or deepened, a notice of intention to drill was filed. (Section 3203.) If the surface location of the proposed well was
within 100 feet from the boundary of a parcel of property,
the supervisor served a notice of disapproval on the operator
and, if drilling continued in disregard of the disapproval,
'The supervisor could obtain II subsurfn~e survey b;v exer~ise of his
im'estigative powers under section 335i. That sectioll, however, requires complicated legal proceedings after the supervisor suspects
thnt a well has he en drilled in dolation of the {'ode; section 3606
lI110ws him to require a survey lit the time he gives approval of the
notice of intention to drill.
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the supervisor requested the attorney general to abate the
well as a public nuisance. During this period of 14
years the supervisor did not make any investigation regarding the location of the producing interval of wells. In 1945,
section 3606 was added to the code and thereafter the supervisor required all operators wishing to drill wells under that
section to include in their notices of intention to drill a statement of the proposed bottom hole location, and also required
the filing of subsurface directional surveys. When wells
were not drilled under section 3606, the policy remained the
same as that since 1931. In 1947, section 3608 was added
to the code and the other sections were reenacted. The
policy of the supervisor remained unchanged.
It thus appears from the record that during the 19 years
preceding trial of this action section 3600 was consistently
interpreted by the 'supervisor as applying only to the surface location of wells. [6] "[T]he contemporaneous administrative construction of the enactment by those charged
with its enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great i
weight, and courts generally will not depart from such interpretatioa unless it is clearly erroneous or, unauthorized."
(Ooca-Oola 00. v. State Board of Equalization, 25 Ca1.2d 918,
921 [156 P.2d 1]; Holloway v. Purcell, 35 Ca1.2d 220, 226
[217 P.2d 665] ; Mudd v. McOolgan, 30 Ca1.2d 463, 470 [188
P.2d 10] jNelson v. Dean, 27 Ca1.2d 873, 881 [168 P.2d 16,
168 A.L.R. 467].) Since the supervisor has maintained a
consistent administrative policy for many years, the oil industry in this state has undoubtedly relied upon that poliey
and expended substantial sums of money in the belief that .
the supervisor's interpretation of section 3600 is correct.
[6] Although failure to enforce statutes of this state will not
estop a state agency from their subsequent enforcement
(Oaminetti v. State Mut. Life Ins. 00., 52 Cal.App.2d 821,
326 [126 P.2d 165] ; cf. People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal.App.41,
53 [24 P.2d 965]), past administrative action is evidence of
t.he limits of the power to act (se~ Federal Trade Oom. v.
Bunte Brotkers, 312 U.S. 349, 352 [61 8. Ct. 580, 85 L.BeL
881] ; Pacific Tel. & Tel. 00. v. Public Utilit·ies Oom., S4 Cal.
2d 822, 831 [215 P.2d 441] ; 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction [3d ed.] § 5106), particularly when a statute is reenacted
without change in the light of a settled administrative interpretation. (Mudd v. McOolgan, supra, 30 Ca1.2d 463, 471;
Nels()'l/, v. Dean, supra, 27 Cal.2d 873, 882.)

)
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Richfield contends that defendants have shown only
a "mere failure to act," which is not enough to be an administrative interpretation, citing Estate 0/ Madison, 26 Cal.
2<1453,463 [159 P.2d 630]. In the Madison case, however,
thc agency had not taken allY steps from which the administrative interpretation of the statute could be discovered. In
the present case the supervisor has continuously taken affirmative steps to carry out the policy of the oil spacing legisla- :
tion, according to his interpretation. When the surface
location of wells violates section 3600, or the producing interval violates section 3606, proceedings are set in motion
to have the well abated as a public nuisance. When the
surface location of a well is beyond 100 feet of an outer
boundary no investigation is made regarding the producing
'interval. Thus the supervisor has consistently indicated I
that he interprets section 3600 as inapplicable to the subsurface location of oil wells.
Richfield contends that the supervisor's interpretation
should not be given any weight on the ground that he is not
charged with the duty of enforcing section 3600. If the
supervisor discovers that an operator is violating the well
spacing statute (see §§ 3203, 3210, 3214, 3236, 3357, 3606),
he either requests the attorney general to seek an injunction
or the district attorney of the particular county to prosecute
the offender for commission of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code,
§ 372.) Thus, in practice the supervisor determines which
operators are subjected to legal proceedings for violation of
the well spacing statute2 and he has the power to obtain enforcement of section 3600 according to his interpretation
thereof.
To support its interpretation of section 3600, Richfield
points out that one of the purposes of the well spacing legislation is conservation of natural resources, relying on the
declaration of purpose contained in the 1947 reenactment:
"Unless this act takes effect immediately, wells will be drilled
in violation of the policy of this State expressed in these
sections for the conservation of natural resources and the
observance of safe and orderly oil field operations upon the
"For example, a recent decision of this court involving section 3608
(Hunter v. J1J8tice'a Court, 36 Ca1.2d 315 [223 P.2d 465]) arose after
the supervisor discovered an operator drilling a well in violation of
the statute and asked the district attorney to prosecute him.
39 C.2d-U

)
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surface of the land and as a result of such violation large
<lualltities of natural gas would be wasted to the air."
[7] Prevention of waste of oil and gas is undoubtedly a
matter of public concern, and this court has repeatedly upheld the legislative power to prevent such waste. (Hunter
v. Justice's Coud, 36 Ca1.2d 315, 317-318 [223 P.2d 465],
and cases cited therein.) [8] Richfield correctly asserts "that
the objective sought to be achieved by a statute as well as
the evil to be prewnted is of prime consideration in its interpretation" (Rock Creek etc. Dist. v. County of Calaveras,
29 Ca1.2d 7, 9 [172 P.2d 863]), but that rule of construction
is not controlling here, for it is not shown that waste of oil
and gas will result under the interpretation of section 3600
urged by defendants. Spacing of wells at the surface as re- !
quired by sections 3600-3608 will limit the number of wells
that may be drilled to the source of supply and will thus
carry out the purpose of oil conservation.
Had the Legislature intended section 3600 to apply to producing intervals, it would have been a simple matter to provide that a well's penetration of the producing formation
must not vary from a vertical drawn from a properly placed
surface location. (Compare Fla.Stat.Ann. c. 377, § 377.26 i
No.Car.Gen.Stats. § 113-393D.)
[9] For the foregoing reasons we have concluded that the
statute applies only to the surface location of oil wells. The
judgment in favor of defendants on Richfield's first cause
of action must be affirmed, since Well 1 does not violate
section 3600.
The Boundary Dispute
;'"
In its second cause of action, Richfield alleged that defendants had committed an underground trespass by driJ.ling
the producing interval of Well 1 under Richfield's property
to the east of parcel four. At the trial Richfield and defendants differed as to the proper method of surveying the
boundary between the properties involved. The trial court
found that defendants' method was correct and that Well 1
was located entirely within parcel four.
At the time of the original lease from Russell, the own~
of all the property involved in this litigation, to the Noms
Oil Company in 1945, the property was described only by
reference to northerly extensions of government section lines.
The sublease of parcels one and four to Carpenter and Henderson in 1947 was based upon a reference to section num-
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bers and was not described by metes and bounds. 8 In January,
1948, Norris subleased other portions of the property to
Anderson Associates (Richfield's predecessor in interest) expressly excepting the Carpenter and Henderson lease by reference to government sections.
Subsequently, title companies refused to insure the location
of the property on the ground that the descriptions were too
uncertain. Russell, Norris, Richfield, and several sublessees
entered into a boundary agreement on February 19, 1948,
defining boundaries between the parties by reference to a base
line, the southwest boundary of the Russell Ranch. Carpenter
and Henderson were not parties to this agreement and it
excepted their land, describing it by reference to government
sections. On March 13, 1948, a number of sublessees executed
a second boundary agreement, but, again, Carpenter and Henderson were not parties thereto.
On March 15, 1948, Carpenter and Henderson quitclaimed
to Norris Oil Company all interest in the Norris lease except
parcels one and four, describing these parcels by a legal
description substantially identical with that used in the
boundary agreements and describing the east boundary of
the parcels as follows: "Beginning at a point . . . marked
'Cuyama Rancho C·No. 31' . . . thence N. 65°10'24" West
alonf! said SW line . . . a distance of 2,877.60 feet j thence
due North 13,295.04 feet to true point of beginning... . "4
On April 20, 1948, Norris Oil Company gave Carpenter and
Henderson a new sublease for parcels one and four, again
using this "due north" description of the east boundary.
The "due north" description was used again on June 22,
8The property wos desrribeil: "The ~outheast (]uarter of the southeast quarter of Seetion 25, Township 11 North, Range 28 West; and
tht> northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of Section 36, Township
11 Nortll, Range 28 Wc~t; B.B.B. & M. The lanCl described llerein i~
nn8urYe~oeil and iR bRsed on a northerl~' extension of the southerly
section linl's; .
llJ1d eontains eight~· M.res, more or le"s."
'The full deseription provides: "Beginning at 8 point in the SW
line of said Rnneho at II 2-in.ch galYanized iron pipe 6-inehes high in
a mound of st.ones, brnss-eap markc(l 'Cu~-nma Rancho C-Noo 31', Bet
by Gerald C. Fitzgera1<1, registered Cidl Engineer, and shown on map
recorded in Book 26, Pages 138 and 13!l of Records of Surveys, Records
of BaiCl Snnta R:uhara Co .. thence N 65°10'24" West along snid SW
line M est. a blisheCl by said Gcra]CI C. Fitzgerald nnd shown on said
RerordR of SurYE'~' map a Clistance of 2,S77.60 fE'et; thence due North
13,2!l5.04 feet to true point of begimling; them'e due West ]320 feet;
t.hence due North 2640 feet; then('e due East 1320 feet; tllence due
South 2460 fed, to thE' truE' point of h('ginning'. Imd ('ontaining eighty
neTes, more or less."
0

•
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1949, when parcel four was subleased to defendants by Car-

penter and Henderson.
The following diagram, not drawn to scale, indicates the
property described by the "due north" terminology.

......- - 1

"B"

(true point of
beslnn1Dg)

"C-3B"

•

)

)

13,295.0' teet
from "A" to "B"

9,07'1.60 teet
tl'0II1 "A"1;o "C-31"
Richfield surveyed the legal description of the property
by running the line 2877.60 feet along the boundary of the
ranch established by Fitzgerald (the line "0-31" to "0-82")
to point "A," and then turning an angle of 65°10'24" on
the transit at that point and surveyjng the line from "A" to
"B," the true point of beginning for parcels one and four.
This method, known as a basis of bearings survey, assumed
for purposes of the survey that the southwest line of the rancl1
had a bearing of 65°10'24" at point" A." Defendants' survey
used the same method as Richfield to find the location of point
"A." At that point, however, they surveyed the call "thence
due North 18,295.04 feet to true paint of beginning," by running the line "true north" in the same manner ali the township boundary would have been surveyed under the description in the original sublease, i.e., based on an observation of
the North Star. (See 5 Thompson on Real Property,
§ 2824.) Since the sonthwest line of the ranch did D:0t
actually have a bearing of 65°10'24" at point" A," the dif-
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ference of the two surveys at point "B" was approximately
11 feet, east and west.
The trial court permitted Richfield and defendants to present considerable extrinsic evidence regarding the proper
method of surveying the "A" to "B" line. Substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that defendants'
method was correct. Dr. Thomas, a professor at the California Institute of Technology and president of the American
Society of Civil Engineers in 1950, testified that good engineering practice required an astronomical observation to
survey the "due north" call. Alfred Jones, chief engineer
and surveyor of Los Angeles County for 10 years, stated that
ordinarily a "due north" call should be run as "true north."
R. V. Pearsall, a licensed surveyor since 1913, agreed with
Thomas and Jones. Richfield called several experts who
testified that the description should be surveyed by a basis
of bearings method. This testimony created a con1lict in the
evidence, which was resolved in favor of defendants by the
trier of fact.
The trial court properly admitted the extrinsic evidence.
[10] Surveyors and civil engineers, like other experts, may
give testimony on questions involving matters of technical
skill and experience with which they are peculiarly acquainted. (Jenny Lind Co. v. Bower ({1 Co., 11 Cal. 194, 197;
Byard v. Hoelscher, 112 Conn. 5, 9 [151 A. 351] ; Dundalk
Holding Co. v. Easter, - - Md. - - [73 A.2d 877, 879];
Gutha v. Roscommon County Road Com., 296 Mich. 600, 607
[296 N.W. 694] j Zip! v. Dalgarn, 114 Ohio St. 291, 295
[151 N.E. 174] j Pennington v. Mixon, 199 Ala. 74 [74 So.
238] j Tacoma Bldg. ({1 Sav. Ass'n v. Clark, 8 Wash. 289 [36
P. 135] ; Burgess v. Healey, 73 Utah 316, 318 [273 P. 968] ;
7 Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.], p. 87; 11 C.J.S., Boundaries,
§ 107, p. 703; contra: Edwards v. Ritter Lbr. Co., 163 Va.
851, 857 [177 S.E. 841] ; Vaught v. McClymond, 116 Mont.
542,555 [155 P.2d 612].) [11] The testimony is not accepted
for the purpose of ,'arying or contradicting the terms of the
deed, but to aid the trial court in its difficult task of translating the words of the deed into monuments on the surface
of the earth, in accord with accepted surveying practices.
Thus, as early as 1858 this court held that surveyors could
be examined on the question whether the professional practice
in the community was to run a "north" call "true north"
or "magnetic north ", since without the extrinsic evidence
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the court could not determine the boundary indicated by the
words of the deed. (Jenny Lind Co. v. Bower, supra.)
The findings of the trial court, based on the conflicting expert testimony and its interpretation of the deed, are consistent with the boundary description in the deed. [12] Unless other terms of a deed or admissible extrinsic evidence
show that a different method was intended by the parties, a
"due north" call should be surveyed on an astronomical
basis. (Anaheim Sugar Co. v. County of Orange, 181 Cal.
212, 222 [183 P. 809] j Fratt v. Woodward, 32 Cal. 219, 227
[91 Am.Dec. 573] j E. E. McCalla Co. v. Sleeper, 105 Cal.App.
562, 569 [288 P. 146] j GutlLa v. Roscommon County Road
Corn., 296 :Mich. 600, 607 [296 N.W. 694] ; Plaquemines Oil
«7 Dev. Co. v. State, 208 La. 425, 439 [23 So.2d 171].)
[13] The base line was properly surveyed along the line
from "C-31" to ,. C-32" and not by use of the 65°10'24"
bearing described in the deed, since the call to the known
boundary line of the ranch prevailed over the call to its
astronomical bearing. (Wagnor v. Blume, 71 Cal.App.2d 94,
101 [161 P.2d 1001].) There is no reason why the 65°10'24"
bearing, rejected in locating point "A," must as a matter
of law be used in surveying the remaining calls in the description. Richfield points out that in many cases a "due
north" or "north" call has been surveyed on other than an
astronomical basis (see Currier v. Nelson, 96 Cal. 505; 508
[31 P. 531, 746, 31 Am.St.Rep. 239] ; Martin v. Lloyd, 94
Cal. 195, 202 [29 P. 491] j Faris v. Phelan, 39 Cal. 612, 618;
Green v. Palmer, 68 Cal.App. 393, 401 [229 P. 876] ; Guflul
v. Roscommon County Road Com., supra), but in each of the
cited cases other parts of the deed or the findings of the court
based on admissible extrinsic evidence required a rejecti~
of the astronomical method of surveying the call. In the pres.
ent case, substantial evidence supports the finding of the trial
court that defendants' method of survey was correct.
:;'
The trial court admitted extrinsic evidence showing that by
"due north" the parties to the boundary agreements meant
that the call in the deeds should be surveyed only by a basis
of bearings method. Richfield contends that this evidence requires reversal of the judgment, invoking another aspect of
the parol evidence rule: that evidence of the circumstances
surrounding execution of a written instrument is admissible
to determine its meaning. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1860.) Carpenter and Henderson and defendants, however, were not
parties to the boundary agreements, and it is not shown that
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they had actual notice that Richfield and Norris Oil Company attached a particular meaning to the words "due
north." The conduct of Carpenter and Henderson indicates
that they believed that the "due north" description in the
March 15th quitclaim deed was interchangeable with the
government section description in the 1947 sublease. [14] Although evidence of the negotiations preceding execution of
the bl)Undary agreements may be admissible as between the
parties thereto (see Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Cal.2d 95,
104 [173 P.2d 17] ; G. R. Holcomb Estate Co. v. Burke, 4 Cal.
2d 289,296 [48 P.2d 669] ; Balfour v. Fresno Canal & Jrr. Co.,
109 Cal. 221, 226 [41 P. 876] ), a special interpretation of the
quitclaim deed could not be enforced against a party relying
upon the words of the instrument and without knowledge '
of the meaning attached thereto by the other party to that
deed. (See Bennett v. Newell, 266 Mass. 127, 132 [165 N.E.
27] ; Dick v. Goldberg, 295 Ill. 86, 94 [128 N.E. 723] ; Attor'I1ey-Genera~ v. Shore, 11 Sim. 592, 631, 59 Eng.Rep. 1002,
1021; 9 Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.], p. 207.) [15] Thus,
in tIle present case the expert testimony of surveyors and
engineers showing the proper method of surveying the calls
in thp. deed was admissible as against both parties to the
deed, since they must be deemed to know that "technical
words are to be interpreted as usually understood by parties
in the profession or business to which they relate" (Oiv. Code,
§ 1645), but evidence of the negotiations of the parties to
the boundary agreements could not be admitted to the detriment of defendants, for it would be manifestly unjust to
charge them with the secret interpretation of other parties
after defendants had relied upon the ordinary meaning of the
words of the instrument. (See Davenport v. Davenport
FottndaHon,
36 Oa1.2d 67, 72 f222 P.2d 11] ; Brant v. CaU·
t
fornia Dairies, Inc., 4 Oal.2d 128, 133 [48 P.2d 13].)
Richfield next contends that defendants' survey results
in disregarding the caUs of the deed. Part of this argument is based on the fact that defendants disregard the
65°10'24" bearing in determining the location of point" A"
on the line from" 0-31" to "0-32." Since Richfield locates
point" A" by thp. same method as defendants, the argument
is without mNit. In thr remainder of the survey, north from
point "A" to point "B," and thence due west, due north.
due p.ast, and due south to point" B" again. it is clear that
nefrnoants' survey will desrribe a closed figure.

